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a b s t r a c t
We consider the problem of designing an efficient and robust distributed random
number generator for peer-to-peer systems that is easy to implement and works
even if all communication channels are public. A robust random number generator is
crucial for avoiding adversarial join–leave attacks on peer-to-peer overlay networks.
We show that our new generator together with a light-weight rule recently proposed
in [B. Awerbuch, C. Scheideler, Towards a scalable and robust DHT, in: Proc. of
the 18th ACM Symp. on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA, 2006. See also
http://www14.in.tum.de/personen/scheideler] for keeping peers well distributed can keep
various structured overlay networks in a robust state even under a constant fraction of
adversarial peers.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Due to their many applications, peer-to-peer systems have recently received a lot of attention both inside and outside of
the research community.Most of the structuredpeer-to-peer systems are based on two influential papers: a paper by Plaxton
et al. on locality-preserving data management in distributed environments [22] and a paper by Karger et al. on consistent
hashing and web caching [14]. The consistent hashing approach is a very simple and elegant approach that assigns to each
peer a (pseudo-)random point in the [0, 1)-interval. Based on this approach, various local-control rules have been proposed
to decide how to interconnect the peers so that they form a well-connected network with good routing properties that is
easy to maintain (see, e.g., [20] for a general framework).
In open peer-to-peer systems, the presence of adversarial peers cannot be avoided. Hence, not only scalability but
also robustness against adversarial behavior is an important issue. The key to scalability and robustness for peer-to-peer
networks based on the consistent hashing approach is to keep the honest and adversarial peers well distributed in the
[0, 1)-interval. However, just assigning a randomor pseudo-randompoint to each newpeer (by using some randomnumber
generator or cryptographic hash function) does not suffice to keep the honest and adversarial peers well spread [2]. People
in the peer-to-peer community are well aware of this problem [8,9] and various solutions have been proposed that may
help alleviating it in practice [6,7,21,29,30,32] but until recently nomechanismwas known that can provably keep the peers
in a well-distributed state without sacrificing the openness of the system.
Various light-weight perturbation rules that can keep the honest and adversarial peers well distributed have recently
been proposed in [4,11,28]. These rules do not need to be able to distinguish between the honest and adversarial peers, but
a crucial prerequisite for them towork is a robust distributed randomnumber generator. This randomnumber generator has
to work correctly in a system without mutual trust relationships and must be robust against arbitrary adversarial behavior
to be applicable to peer-to-peer systems. Certainly, designing such a random number generator is not an easy task.
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1.1. Robust distributed random number generation
How can we generate random numbers in a peer-to-peer systemwith adversarial presence? The most naive approach is
to let every peer generate its own random numbers. This approach is problematic since in a dynamic peer-to-peer system
it is impossible to collect sufficient statistical evidence to accuse a particular peer of generating non-random numbers. Yet,
somewhat surprisingly, it is still possible to use this approach to maintain a robust peer-to-peer network, but at the cost of
losing scalability [3]. So a different approach is needed.
Amore reasonable approach is the following. Suppose thatwe need a randomnumber generator that generates a number
by selecting a binary string uniformly at random out of {0, 1}s for some s. Consider the situation that a group P of the peers
wants to generate a randomnumber. Each (honest) peer p in P may then select a randomnumber xp ∈ {0, 1}s and commit to
it to all other peers in P using a bit commitment scheme (a particularly secure one-way hash function h for which h(x) does
not reveal anything about x) [13,19]. Once all commitments have been made, the peers will reveal their random numbers,
and if they all do, every peer computes x = ⊕p∈P xp, where ⊕ is the bit-wise XOR operation. The XOR operation has the
nice property that as long as at least one xp is chosen uniformly at random and the other numbers are independent of it,
x is distributed uniformly at random in {0, 1}s. Hence, if the scheme succeeds and at least one honest peer participates in
it, a random number x will be generated. But the adversarial peers can easily let the scheme fail, and this not only in an
oblivious manner but also in an adaptive manner (by just waiting for enough numbers xp to be revealed before revealing
their own numbers). Thus, in order to avoid a significant bias on the successfully generated random numbers, the fraction
of adversarial peers in the system would have to be so small that no adversarial peer will be present in most of the groups
P that are used for the random number generation. Such an approach was pursued in [2].
To avoid the problems above, we recently proposed a distributed random number generator that is based on verifiable
secret sharing [4]. This random number generator can still fail if the peer initiating it does not behave correctly, but it has
the advantage that if the peer initiating it is honest, then the random number generation is guaranteed to succeed, and
whenever the random number generation succeeds, the number generated will be random.
Yet, using this scheme is not completely satisfying. First of all, an adversary can let it fail in an adaptive manner (i.e., it
can let it fail after knowing the final key), which is sufficient to create a significant bias, even though the adversary cannot
undermine the randomness of the generated key. It just has to run sufficiently many attempts until a key is generated that
falls into a desired range. Furthermore, the scheme is not easy to implement and private channels are needed between the
peers. So the question that led to this paper was:
Is it possible to design an elementary and sufficiently unbiased distributed randomnumber generator that evenworks for public
channels and a constant fraction of adversarial peers?
Remarkably, this paper shows that this is possible.
1.2. Related work on random number generation
Surprisingly little has been published about robust random number generators for distributed systems. Random number
generators have mostly been studied in the context of pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) with small seed or
cryptographically secure random number generators (CSRNG). The main difference between a PRNG and a CSRNG is that
a CSRNG should be indistinguishable from random on any examination, whereas a PRNG is normally only required to look
random to standard statistical tests. For foundations and surveys on random number generators see, e.g., [12,17,25,34].
There are many protocols for distributed systems with adversarial presence that need random numbers for atomic
broadcasting, leader election and almost-everywhere agreement (e.g., [15,23] for recent results), but in these it is sufficient
that every peer chooses its own random numbers.
Unbiased random numbers can be computed via verifiable secret sharing or secure multiparty computation schemes
(e.g., [5,31]), but these are not easy to implement (since they need error correction techniques), and they require private
channels.
1.3. Details of our random number generator
The basic idea behind our random number generator is the insight that generating a single random number is difficult
with public channels but generating a batch of random numbers is doable. An m-random number generator (or m-RNG) is a
random number generator that generates a batch of up to m random numbers. We assume that every random number is
represented as a binary string in {0, 1}s for some fixed s. Given an m-RNG G and any subset S ⊆ {0, 1}s, let EG(S) be the
expected number of keys y generated by G with y ∈ S. Ideally, G should satisfy EG(S) = m · |S|/2s for all S ⊆ {0, 1}s. Let
E(S) = m · |S|/2s. Then we define the bias β(G) of G as
β(G) = max
S⊆{0,1}s
max
{
EG(S)
E(S)
,
E(S)
EG(S)
}
.
The m-RNG that we present in this paper is called round-robin random number generator (or short round-robin RNG). Let P
be the group ofm peers this protocol is applied to. The basic ideas of the protocol can be summarized as follows:
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• When correctly initiated, every peer in P will supervise the generation of one random number in {0, 1}s. A peer whose
random number generation fails can send an accusation to the peers in P in which it can accuse exactly one other
peer. Honest peers will run the random number generation one after the other (using a proper timing scheme) so as
to maximize the effect of the accusations and thereby minimize the number of times an adversarial peer can cause the
failure of a random number generation supervised by an honest peer.
• A single randomnumber is generated by the supervising peer taking over the role of a dealer and the others being a group
of players. Both the players and the dealer commit to a key. However, as wewill see, the dealer key is a special master key
that is committed to first and revealed last. In this way, the dealer is the only one that can adaptively decidewhether to let
the randomnumber generation fail or not. However, this is the onlyway inwhich the dealer can bias the randomnumber
generation. It cannot make its probability distribution non-uniform if at least one honest player is participating in it.
More details are given in Section 2. For this protocol, the following theorem is shown.
Theorem 1.1. Suppose that |P| = m and there are t < m/6 adversarial peers in P. Then the round-robin RNG generates random
keys y1, y2, . . . , yk ∈ {0, 1}s with m− 2t ≤ k ≤ m and the property that for all subsets S ⊆ {0, 1}s with σ = |S|/2s,
E[|{i | yi ∈ S}|] ∈ [(m− 2t)σ , m · σ ]
that is, the round-robin RNG has a bias β of at most 1+ 2tm−2t . The worst-case message complexity of the protocol is O(m2).
It turns out that the bias of the round-robin RNG is small enough in order to maintain a scalable and robust peer-to-peer
network.
1.4. Application to robust peer-to-peer networks
In the area of peer-to-peer systems, work on robustness in the context of overlay network maintenance has mostly
focused on how to handle a large fraction of faulty peers (e.g., [1,26,33]) or churn, that is, peers frequently enter and leave
the system (e.g., [16,24]). However, none of these approaches can protect a peer-to-peer network against adaptive join–
leave attacks. In an adaptive join–leave attack, adversarial peers repeatedly join and leave a network in order to occupy
certain areas of the network. To prevent them from doing this, proper join and leave protocols have to be found so that the
honest and adversarial peers are kept well spread in the [0, 1)-interval. More precisely, what we would like to aim for is
that at any time point with n peers in the system the following two conditions can be met for every interval I ⊆ [0, 1) of
size at least (c log n)/n for a constant c > 0:
• Balancing condition: I containsΘ(|I| · n) peers.
• Majority condition: the honest peers in I are in the majority.
If this is the case, then proper region-based overlay networks and routing rules can be defined to guarantee connectivity
and correct routing (e.g., [4]). However, maintaining the two conditions under adaptive adversarial join–leave attacks turns
out to be quite tricky. Just assigning a random or pseudo-random point to each new peer (by using some random number
generator or cryptographic hash function) does not suffice to preserve the balancing andmajority conditions [2]. Fortunately,
just recently we found a join operation, called cuckoo rule, that can solve this problem [4].
1.5. The cuckoo rule
In the following, a region is an interval of size 1/2r in [0, 1) for some integer r that starts at an integer multiple of 1/2r .
Hence, there are exactly 2r regions of size 1/2r . For any constant k > 0, a k-region is a region of size (closest from above to)
k/n, and for any point x ∈ [0, 1), the k-region Rk(x) is the unique k-region containing x.
k-cuckoo rule: If a new node v wants to join the system, pick a random x ∈ [0, 1). Place v into x andmove all nodes in Rk(x)
to points in [0, 1) chosen uniformly and independently at random (without replacing any further nodes).
Suppose that we have n honest peers and n adversarial peers in the system for some  < 1. For the situation that the
adversary adaptively rejoins the systemwith its peers in a one-by-one fashion, it was shown [4] that as long as  < 1−1/k,
the k-cuckoo rule satisfies the balancing and majority conditions for a polynomial number of rejoin operations, with high
probability. However, for the cuckoo rule to be implementable in a distributed system, a robust distributed random number
generator is needed. Furthermore, the cuckoo rulemay need up toO(log2 n) randombits in theworst case (forO(log n) peers
that need to be replaced).
1.6. The round-robin cuckoo rule
The problem with O(log2 n) bits is solved by proposing a slight adaptation of the cuckoo rule that we call the de Bruijn
cuckoo rule. The new rule has the benefit that only O(log n) random bits are needed in the worst case (for two random points
in [0, 1)).
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In order to solve the problem with the random number generator, we combine the round-robin RNG with the de Bruijn
cuckoo rule to the so-called round-robin cuckoo rule. It works in a way that for every successful random number generation
in the round-robin RNG, the de Bruijn cuckoo rule is used. The protocol has the following performance.
Consider adversarial join–leave attacks in a systemwith n honest peers and n adversarial peers. Let β be the bias of the
round-robin RNG. Then it holds:
Theorem 1.2. For any constants , k > 0 and β ≥ 1 with  < (1/β)(1/β − 1/k), the round-robin cuckoo rule with bias
β satisfies the balancing and majority conditions for a polynomial number of rounds, with high probability, for any adversarial
strategy within our model.
Hence, Theorem 1.2 is a natural extension of the result in [4], which assumes a bias of β = 1.
1.7. Structure of the paper
In Section 2, we present the round-robin random number generator, and in Section 3 we show how to use it to counter
join–leave attacks in peer-to-peer networks. The paper ends with conclusions.
2. Robust random number generation
In this section we consider the situation that we have a set P of m players denoted p1, . . . , pm. We distinguish between
honest and adversarial players. The honest players follow the protocol in a correct and timely manner, whereas the
adversarial players may behave in an arbitrary way, including arbitrary collusion among the adversarial players. Our goal
is to find elementary protocols that construct random numbers with a uniform distribution in {0, 1}s for some given s, even
under adversarial presence.
First, we state some assumptions, and then we present the round-robin random number generator. After its analysis, we
discuss some extensions for peer-to-peer systems.
2.1. Assumptions
We assume that only point-to-point communication is available and that all information sent out by a player can be seen
by the adversary. Thus, no broadcasting primitive and no private channels are given, which is often the case in other robust
distributed protocols like verifiable secret sharing. We just need a mechanism that allows the players to verify the sender of
a message. For this, we assume the existence of a proper signature scheme. A messagem signed by player pwill be denoted
as (m)p.
Honest players are supposed to act not only in a correct but also a timelymanner (which is important tomaintain dynamic
systems such as peer-to-peer networks).We assume that anymessage sent from one honest player to another honest player
needs at most δ time steps to be received and processed by the recipient for some fixed δ, and we assume that the clock
speeds of the honest players are roughly the same. However, the clocks do not have to be synchronized (i.e., show the same
time) nor do we require the protocols to run in a synchronous mode (i.e., all players must send their messages at exactly the
same time). The latter assumption makes it hard to generate unbiased random keys even though there is a notion of time
because the adversarial players can always choose to be the last to send out messages, thereby maximizing the control they
have on the generation of the random number.
For the random number generation, we need a bit commitment scheme h, i.e., a scheme where h(x) does not reveal
anything about x (besides being robust to finding collision pairs). In practice, a cryptographic hash function might be
sufficient for h so that the protocols below can be easily implemented. Furthermore,we assume that all honest players have a
perfect randomnumber generator. In practice, pseudo-randomnumber generators that pass a certain collection of statistical
tests (such as the DIEHARD tests) might be sufficient here. The bit commitment scheme is needed to commit to random keys
without revealing them, and the perfect random number generator is needed to generate unbiased random keys.
2.2. Round-robin random number generator
Suppose that we have a set P of m players, p1, . . . , pm, that know each other and their indexing, with any t of them
being adversarial for some t < m/6. The round-robin random number generator works as follows for some player p∗ ∈ P
initiating it.
Startup: p∗ sends a signed request to initiate the random number generation to all players in P . Once player pi ∈ P receives
p∗s signed initiation request for the first time (from anywhere), it forwards it to all other players in P . In addition to this, it
sets Pi := P \ {pi} and waits for i · 8δ time steps. Once the i · 8δ steps are over, pi initiates the key generation scheme below.
Each time throughout the robust RNG protocol that pi receives an accusation (pk)pj from a player pj ∈ P it has not received
an accusation from yet, it sets Pi := Pi \ {pk}. pi terminates after (m+1)8δ steps (i.e., from that point on it ignores all further
messages sent to it for the robust RNG protocol initiated by p∗).
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a part of the robust RNG for the case thatm = 4, p∗ = p3 and all players are honest and reliable, which implies that P1 = {p2, p3, p4}.
Recall that each message transmission between reliable players takes at most δ time steps. (δ-intervals with no activity are displayed shorter.)
Key generation: Once the waiting time of i · 8δ steps has passed for player pi, the following steps are executed (Fig. 1):
(1) If |Pi| ≥ 2m/3, then pi chooses a random xi ∈ {0, 1}s and sends (h(xi), Pi)pi to all players in Pi. Otherwise, pi aborts the
protocol (which will not happen if t < m/6).
(2) Each player pj ∈ Pi receiving a message (yi, Pi)pi with |Pi ∩ P| ≥ 2m/3 for the first time from a player pi ∈ P chooses a
random xj ∈ {0, 1}s and sends the message (pi, h(xj))pj to pi. Otherwise, it does nothing.
(3) If all players pj ∈ Pi reply with a message (pi, zj)pj for some zj within 2δ time steps of finishing step 1, then pi sends
({(pi, zj)pj | pj ∈ Pi})pi to all players in Pi. Otherwise, pi sends an accusation (pj)pi for some fixed pj ∈ Pi that did not
reply correctly or in time to all players in P and stops its attempt of generating a random number.
(4) Each player pj ∈ Pi receiving ({(pi, zk)pk | pk ∈ Pi})pi for the first time from pi checks whether this message indeed
contains commitments (pi, zk)pk from all pk ∈ Pi. If so, pj sends (xj)pj to pi. Otherwise, pj stops participating in the key
generation process for pi.
(5) If pi gets a correct reply (i.e., h(xj) = zj) back from all players in Pi within 2δ time steps of finishing step 3, it sends
(xi, {(xj)pj | pj ∈ Pi})pi to all players in Pi and computes yi = xi ⊕
⊕
pj∈Pi xj where ⊕ is the bit-wise XOR operation.
Otherwise, pi sends an accusation (pj)pi to all players in P for some fixed pj ∈ Pi that did not reply correctly or in time
and stops.
(6) Once pj ∈ Pi receives (xi, {(xk)pk | pk ∈ Pi})pi , pj checks if all keys are correct. If not, then pj stops participating in the key
generation process for pi. Otherwise, pj computes y
(j)
i = xi ⊕
⊕
qk∈Pi xk and sends the message (y
(j)
i )pj to pi.
(7) If pi receives yi from at least 2m/3 players in P within 2δ time steps of finishing step 5, it accepts the computation and
otherwise sends an accusation (pj)pi to all players in P for some fixed pj ∈ Pi that did not reply correctly or in time.
We define the random number generation of pi to be successful if pi receives the same key from at least 2m/3 many players
in step 7. This is important for pi since it will need the support of at least 2m/3 other players for further operations that we
will discuss in the next section.
2.3. Analysis of the round-robin RNG
We will show that the round-robin RNG has the following performance.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that |P| = m and there are t < m/6 adversarial players in P. If at least one honest peer receives p∗s
initiation request, then the round-robin RNG successfully generates random keys y1, y2, . . . , yk ∈ {0, 1}s with m− 2t ≤ k ≤ m
and the property that for all subsets S ⊆ {0, 1}s with σ = |S|/2s,
E[|{i | yi ∈ S}|] ∈ [(m− 2t)σ ,m · σ ].
The worst-case message complexity of the protocol is O(m2).
In order to prove the theorem, we start with some simple claims.
Some basic facts
Because of the flooding strategy during startup and the definition of δ it holds:
Claim 1. No matter whether p∗ is adversarial or not, if at least one honest peer receives p∗s initiation request, then all honest
players start the protocol within δ steps.
Since each honest player pi needs at most 7δ time steps to complete the key generation initiated by it and starts after
waiting for i · 8δ steps, the claim above implies the following claim.
Claim 2. No two honest players execute their key generation scheme at the same time.
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Hence, honest player pi can make use of the accusations of all honest players pj with j < i in order to keep its own
problems with the random number generation as small as possible.
Next, we bound the size of any Pi for an honest player pi. Recall that honest players are supposed to work in a correct
and timely manner. Hence, honest players will never accuse other honest players of any wrongdoing but only adversarial
players. Since every adversarial player can issue at most one accusation to any honest player, there will be at least m − 2t
honest players left in every set Pi of an honest player pi throughout the protocol. Hence, we get:
Lemma 2.2. If t < m/6 then |Pi| ≥ 2m/3 throughout the protocol for every honest player pi.
Moreover, every player pi can successfully execute the key generation protocol at most once. This is because it must
receive the same key from at least 2m/3many players in the key generation scheme so that the key generation is considered
to be successful. Since t < m/6, this means that there must be more than m/2 honest players that report the same key to
pi. Since every honest player participates at most once in the key generation scheme initiated by pi (see step 2), it follows
that pi can only be successful for at most one key yi.
Lemma 2.3. If t < m/6 then every player can successfully execute the key generation protocol at most once.
Analysis of key generation scheme
Next, we focus on the execution of the key generation scheme by some fixed player pi. First, we consider the case that pi
is honest, and then we consider the case that pi is adversarial.
Lemma 2.4. If pi is honest and |Pi| ≥ 2m/3, then no matter how many adversarial players there are in Pi, the success of the key
generation is independent of yi, and if the protocol terminates successfully, then the key yi generated by pi is distributed uniformly
at random in {0, 1}s and all honest players in Pi compute the same key as pi.
Proof. pi will not reveal xi before the keys in Pi have all been revealed. Hence, the probability distribution on z =⊕pj∈Pi xj
must be independent of xi. For any probability distribution on z = ⊕pj∈Pi xj that is independent of xi it holds that if xi is
chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1}s, then also yi = xi ⊕ z is distributed uniformly at random in {0, 1}s. Moreover, also
the decision of the adversarial players to let the random number generation fail must be independent of xi and can only be
a function of z because xi will not be revealed before the other keys have been revealed. Hence, it holds for any adversarial
strategy and any y∗ ∈ {0, 1}s that
Pr[yi = y∗ | generation of yi successful] = Pr[yi = y∗] = 12s
If pi succeedswith computing yi in step 5, then it informed all players in Pi about the revealed keys before that, and all honest
among them will accept these keys since they match the message sent out by pi in step 3. Hence, all honest players in Pi
compute the same key as pi. 
Notice that if the adversarial players knew about xi before deciding to let the random number generation fail, they can
create a significant bias, even if the other keys were chosen independent of xi. A simple example for this would be:
Focus on any fixed y∗ ∈ {0, 1}s. If yi = y∗, then let the attempt fail, and otherwise let it be successful.
It is easy to see that this would make it very unlikely for the round-robin RNG to generate y∗ (since it would have to be
generated more than t times to be successful at least once). Hence, it is crucial that xi is only revealed after all the other keys
have been revealed. Next, we consider the case that pi is adversarial.
Lemma 2.5. If pi is adversarial, then no matter what pi and the other adversarial players in Pi do, whenever an honest player pj
reveals its key xj, y
(j)
i has a uniform distribution on {0, 1}s, if it exists.
Proof. An honest player pj will only reveal xj once it receives ({(pi, zk)pk | pk ∈ Pi})pi from pi with commitments from
all players in the set Pi player pi has committed to earlier. In this case, xj is a random number that is independent of
z = xi ⊕⊕pk∈Pi\{pj} xk if such values xk exist, since the adversarial nodes may choose zk’s without an xk with h(xk) = zk.
Since xj is independent of z and chosen uniformly at random, y
(j)
i = xj ⊕ z has a uniform distribution, if it exists. 
Notice, however, that it can happen for two honest players pj and pj′ that they compute keys y
(j)
i and y
(j′)
i with y
(j)
i 6= y(j
′)
i .
This happens if pi sends amessage ({(pi, zk)pk | pk ∈ Pi})pi to pj and amessage ({(pi, z ′k)pk | pk ∈ P ′i })pi to pj′ inwhich Pi differs
from P ′i and zk differs from z
′
k whenever pk is adversarial (since it can fake the signature of these players). Nevertheless, if pi
wants to be successful (i.e., collect commitments to the samekey fromat least 2m/3manyplayers), itmust letmore thanm/2
honest players pj succeed with computing the same y
(j)
i . Thus, pi has no choice on which set of the honest players to go for in
order to be successful, but despite Lemma 2.5 the adversarial players can still create a bias on the successfully computed keys
initiated by them since after knowing yi, an adversarial player pi still has the option to let the key generation be successful
(i.e., to inform the honest players about the keys) or not. Fortunately, this bias cannot be too large, as shown next.
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Analysis of the entire protocol
We start with a bound on the bias.
Lemma 2.6. If t < m/6 and at least one honest peer receives p∗s initiation request, then at least m − 2t of the m − t random
number generations initiated by the honest players are successful, irrespective of whether p∗ is adversarial or not. Furthermore, it
holds for all subsets S ⊆ {0, 1}s with σ = |S|/2s that
E[|{i | yi ∈ S for a successful yi}|] ∈ [(m− 2t)σ , m · σ ].
Proof. According to Lemma 2.5, every key yi that an honest player pj commits must be distributed uniformly at random in
{0, 1}s (if it exists). However, whereas the adversarial players can adaptively abort the random number generation initiated
by adversarial players, it follows from the protocol that they can only do this in an oblivious way for the honest players.
We know from Claim 2 that the adversarial players can only sabotage the random number generation of at most t honest
players. This insight together with Lemmas 2.2 and 2.4 implies that at least m − 2t random number generations of honest
players pi will be successful, and their success does not depend on their values. Thus, the probability for any of these players
pi that yi ∈ S is equal to σ and, therefore, the expected number of successful pi’s with yi ∈ S is at least (m− 2t)σ .
On the other hand, we know from Lemma 2.3 that at most m key generations can be successful, and since every
successfully generated key yi is distributed uniformly at random in {0, 1}s (due to Lemma2.5 and the fact that the adversarial
players pi have no choice for the set of honest players to choose from for a successful key yi), the probability for any such yi
to be in S is equal to σ . Hence, the expected number of successful pi’s with yi ∈ S is at mostm · σ . 
The next lemma follows immediately from the protocol.
Lemma 2.7. The message complexity of the round robin-random RNG is O(m2).
2.4. Extensions
In our random number generator we assumed that the players in P know each other and the indexing. This assumption
can be problematic in peer-to-peer systems since there might be a disagreement among the honest players about the set of
adversarial players in P . Fortunately, it is not too difficult to address this issue, as we will show in the following.
First, suppose the simple case that for every player in P there is an agreement among the honest players about its index
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. However, whereas every honest player knows every other honest player in P , it may not know all the
adversarial players in P (resp. the honest players may have different views about which adversarial players are still alive),
and therefore the honest players may have different estimates of |P|. Let us denote player pi’s initial view of P by Vi with
mi = |Vi|. Then the round robin RNG can easily be modified so that Theorem 2.1 still holds:
• In item 1, replace ‘‘|Pi| ≥ 2m/3’’ by ‘‘|Pi| ≥ 2mi/3’’.• In item 2, replace ‘‘|Pi ∩ P| ≥ 2m/3’’ by ‘‘|Pi ∩ Vj| ≥ 2mj/3’’ and ‘‘pi ∈ P ’’ with ‘‘pi ∈ Vj’’.• In item 7, replace ‘‘2m/3’’ by ‘‘2mi/3’’.
Given these rules, the following lemma can be used to replace Lemma 2.2:
Lemma 2.8. If t < m/6 then |Pi| ≥ 2mi/3 throughout the protocol for every honest player pi.
Proof. If t < m/6, then there are at least 5m/6 honest players in P , and all of them are initially in Pi. Since honest players
will never accuse each other, there can be at mostm/6 accusations of honest players. Hence, Pi must contain at least 2m/3
honest players at any time, which implies that |Pi| ≥ 2mi/3. 
Furthermore, the proof of Lemma 2.3 can be replaced as follows.
Lemma 2.9. If t < m/6 then every player can be successful for at most one key.
Proof. A prerequisite for an adversarial player pi to be successful is that for a sufficient number of honest players pj,
|Pi ∩ Vj| ≥ 2mj/3. Let Vj = mh + ma, where mh is the number of honest players and ma is the number of adversarial
players pj is aware of in P . In the worst case, the adversarial player may select Pi ⊆ Vj so that |Pi ∩ Vj| = 2mj/3 and Pi
contains all ma adversarial players that pj knows about. Even then, there are still mh − ma ≥ 2m/3 > m/2 honest players
left in Pi ∩ Vj if t < m/6, which means that more than half of the honest players are needed to successfully generate a key.
Hence, the lemma follows. 
With these lemmas, the remaining results in Section 2.3 still hold.
Another problem is how to fix the indexing issue. When there is disagreement about P , it may not be possible for the
honest players to agree on a common indexing scheme. Instead, they can use the following simple trick. Each player pi picks
a random slot out of c ·mi many slots for generating a random number, where c is a sufficiently large constant. Then it holds
for every honest player pi that Pr[pi avoids the slots taken by other honest players] ≥ (cmi−m)/(cmi) ≥ 1−6/(5c). Hence,
if m = Ω(log n) for some parameter n, then the Chernoff bounds can be used to prove that the number of slots occupied
by the honest players is at least (1 − 2/c)mh, w.h.p. (with respect to n), where mh is the number of honest players. Thus,
the adversarial players would only manage to let up to t+ 2mh/c random number generations of honest players fail, w.h.p.,
instead of just t , which is still acceptable if t + 2mh/c < m/6.
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3. Application to robust peer-to-peer networks
In this sectionwe showhow touse the round-robin randomnumber generator above to satisfy the balancing andmajority
conditions for any adversarial join–leave strategy for a polynomial number of rejoin operations, with high probability. We
start with a formal model. Then we present the de Bruijn cuckoo rule, and afterwards we combine it with the round-robin
RNG to obtain the round-robin cuckoo rule.
3.1. Model
Recall that we want to associate all peers with points in [0, 1). These points can be encoded as binary strings from {0, 1}s
in a sense that b = (b1, . . . , bs) represents xb = ∑i≥1 bi/2i for a sufficiently large s (in SHA-1, which is used by the Chord
system, for example, s = 160).
There are n blue (or honest) nodes and n red (or adversarial) nodes for some fixed constant  < 1. There is a rejoin
operation that, when applied to node v, lets v first leave the system and then join it again from scratch. The leaving is done
by simply removing v from the system and the joining is donewith the help of a join operation to be specified by the system.
We assume that the sequence of rejoin requests is controlled by an adversary. The adversary can only issue rejoin requests
for the red nodes, but it can do this in an arbitrary adaptive manner. That is, at any time it can inspect the entire system and
select whatever red node it likes to rejoin the system. The goal is to find an oblivious join operation, i.e., an operation that
cannot distinguish between the blue and red nodes, so that for any adversarial strategy above the balancing and majority
conditions can be kept for any polynomial number of rejoin requests.
3.2. The de Bruijn cuckoo rule
Recall the original cuckoo rule in Section 1.5. We present a slight but crucial modification to this rule, called the de Bruijn
cuckoo rule, which only needs two random numbers in {0, 1}s, irrespective of k. The prefix de Bruijn was chosen because
the rule can be easily implemented in dynamic de Bruijn graphs, as will be demonstrated in Section 3.3. In the protocol, we
define |Rk(x)| as the number of peers whose positions are in the region Rk(x).
de Bruijn cuckoo rule: If a new peer v wants to join the system, pick random x, y ∈ [0, 1). Place v into x and replace all
peers in Rk(x) in the following way. If |Rk(x)| = 0, we are done, and if |Rk(x)| = 1, then the peer in Rk(x) is moved to position
y. Otherwise, let b = dlog |Rk(x)|e. Given that y is represented by a binary string (y1, . . . , ys) ∈ {0, 1}s, peer i ≥ 0 in Rk(x) is
moved to position ((ys, . . . , ys−b+1) ⊕ (i)2) ◦ (ys−b, . . . , y1) where (i)2 represents the binary representation of i and ◦ the
concatenation.
For example, suppose that y = 0100110 and |Rk(x)| = 3. Then thenewpositions of the three peers are (01⊕00)◦10010 =
0110010 for peer 0, (01 ⊕ 01) ◦ 10010 = 0010010 for peer 1, and (01 ⊕ 10) ◦ 10010 = 1110010 for peer 2. This rule of
mapping peers to new points has the following property:
Lemma 3.1. Every replaced peer is moved to a position that is distributed uniformly at random in {0, 1}s.
Proof. Consider peer i in Rk(x) for any fixed i and suppose that y is distributed uniformly at random in {0, 1}s. Then
(ys, . . . , ys−b+1) ⊕ (i)2 is distributed uniformly at random in {0, 1}b and (ys−b, . . . , y1) is distributed uniformly at random
in {0, 1}s−b, resulting in the lemma. 
Moreover, any two peers in a region Rk(x) with p peers have a distance of at least (1/2)log p+1 ≥ 1/(2p) of each other.
Hence, when looking at the analysis in [4], it turns out that all results still hold when using a perfect random number
generator (though in Lemmas 2.6 and 2.10 the independence property of the new node positions has to be replaced by
negative correlation, but the negative correlation is so small that it is negligible — more precise arguments on this will be
given in Section 3.4).
Theorem 3.2. For any constants  and k with  < 1 − 1/k, the de Bruijn cuckoo rule with parameter k satisfies the balancing
and majority conditions for a polynomial number of rounds, with high probability, for any adversarial strategy within our model.
The inequality  < 1− 1/k is sharp as counterexamples can be constructed otherwise.
3.3. Applying the de Bruijn cuckoo rule in a dynamic de Bruijn graph
To illustrate the application of the de Bruijn cuckoo rule in a dynamic overlay network, wewill introduce the continuous-
discrete variant of the de Bruijn graph proposed by Naor and Wieder [20]. We start with the definition of the classical de
Bruijn graph.
Definition 3.3. The d-dimensional de Bruijn graph DB(d) is an undirected graph G = (V , E)with node set V = [2]d and edge
set E that contains all edges {v,w}with the property that v = (v1, . . . , vd) andw ∈ {(x, v1, . . . , vd−1) : x ∈ {0, 1}}.
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Let us view each binary label (v1, . . . , vd) as a point x ∈ [0, 1)with x =∑di=1 vi/2i and let d go to infinity. Thenwe obtain
a continuous form of the de Bruijn graphwith node set U = [0, 1) and edge set E = {{x, y} ∈ U | y = x/2 or y = (1+ x)/2}.
In order to convert this back into a discrete graph, one can use the continuous-discrete approach of Naor and Wieder [20].
For i ∈ {0, 1} let fi(x) = (i + x)/2. Given any finite set of points V ⊂ [0, 1), we define the home region Uv of point v as
the interval [v, succ(v))where succ(v) is the closest successor of v in V on the [0, 1)-ring, i.e. the minimum pointw ∈ V so
thatw > v. We say that a point v ∈ V owns a point x ∈ [0, 1) if x ∈ Uv .
The de Bruijn graph DB(V ) of a point set V is an undirected graph with node set V that contains an edge {v,w} for every
two points v,w ∈ V with f0(Uv) ∩ Uw 6= ∅ or f1(Uv) ∩ Uw 6= ∅. This definition immediately implies the following fact:
Fact 3. For any set of points V and any two points x, y ∈ [0, 1) with y = fi(x) for some i it holds for the owner v of x and the
ownerw of y that {v,w} is an edge in DB(V ).
If V is well spread over U (i.e., the balancing condition holds), then one can also show that every peer in V has at most
a logarithmic degree in DB(V ) and the diameter of DB(V ) is logarithmic, w.h.p., that is, DB(V ) is a scalable network and
therefore useful for dynamic peer-to-peer systems [20].
Now, recall the de Bruijn cuckoo rule. Given that all peers are reliable, then in order to forward a peer i in Rk(x) to position
((ys, . . . , ys−b+1)⊕ (i)2) ◦ (ys−b, . . . , y1), we first move it along the (owners of the) points
(x1, . . . , xs), (y1, x1, . . . , xs), (y2, y1, x1, . . . , xs), . . . , (ys−b, . . . , y2, y1, x1, . . . , xs)
and from there along the (owners of the) points
(z1, ys−b, . . . , y2, y1, x1, . . . , xs), . . . , (zb, . . . , z1, ys−b, . . . , y2, y1, x1, . . . , xs)
with (zb, . . . , z1) = (ys, . . . , ys−b+1) ⊕ (i)2. Notice that any two consecutive points along this route, let us call them q and
q′, it holds that q′ = q/2 or q′ = (1+ q)/2. Hence, the owners of these two points are connected according to the definition
of the dynamic de Bruijn graph, so it is indeed feasible to forward peer i along the owners of these points. (If not all peers
are reliable, then a region-based routing as sketched in [4] can be used to ensure the correct movement of the peers to their
new positions.)
3.4. The round-robin cuckoo rule
Finally, we show how to combine the de Bruijn cuckoo rule and the round-robin random number generator into a simple
and efficient join protocol called round-robin cuckoo rule that achieves a result similar to Theorem 3.2.
Recall the definition of a region in Section 1.5. Given a node v ∈ [0, 1), we define its quorum region Rv as the unique region
of size closest from above to (γ log n)/n, for a fixed constant γ > 1, that contains v. We demand that whenever a new node
uwants to join the system, it has to do so via a node v already in the system. v then initiates the following protocol:
(1) v initiates the round-robin RNG in Rv (i.e., v acts as p∗).
(2) For each node vi ∈ Rv that successfully executed its key generation protocol, vi initiates the de Bruijn cuckoo rule by
sending a message (yi, {(y(j)i )vj | vj ∈ Pi})vi with all keys y(j)i matching yi to all nodes in Rv .
(3) Each nodew ∈ Rv receiving a correctly signed (yi, {(y(j)i )vj | vj ∈ Pi})vi containing at least 2|Rv|/3 keys for the first time,
forwards it to all other nodes in Rv and initiates the de Bruijn cuckoo rule.
In the de Bruijn cuckoo rule, majority decision is used to execute the proper actions (see [4] for more details). Since step
3 above ensures the ‘‘all or nothing’’ principle concerning the honest peers, the de Bruijn cuckoo rule is guaranteed to be
executed in a correct and timely manner once a single honest peer has received a correct (yi, {(y(j)i )vj | vj ∈ Pi})vi message.
We assume that the new node u can choose to assume any one of the new positions of a successfully executed de Bruijn
cuckoo rule. It just needs to commit to one to the nodes in Rv . If the node v just wants to rejoin the system (like in the
adversarial strategies considered here), then we identify v with u.
3.5. Perturbation with biased randomness
Next we analyze the round-robin cuckoo rule. Recall that we consider adversarial join–leave attacks in a system with n
honest nodes and n adversarial nodes. Let β be the bias of the round-robin RNG. Then it holds:
Theorem 3.4. For any constants , k > 0 and β ≥ 1with  < (1/β)(1/β − 1/k), the round-robin cuckoo rule with the round-
robin RNG with bias β satisfies the balancing and majority conditions for a polynomial number of rounds, with high probability,
for any adversarial strategy within our model.
Proof. The proof is similar to the analysis of the cuckoo rule in [4]. First, we state some technical lemmas. The bounds in the
first are also known as Chernoff bounds.
Lemma 3.5 ([18]). Suppose that X1, . . . , Xn are independent binary random variables. Let X =∑ni=1 Xi and µ = E[X]. Then it
holds for all  ≥ 0 that Pr[X ≥ (1+ )µ] ≤ e−2µ/(2(1+/3)) and for all 0 ≤  ≤ 1 that Pr[X ≤ (1− )µ] ≤ e−2µ/2.
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Lemma 3.6. Suppose that X1, . . . , Xn are independent random variables with Pr[Xi = t] = p(1 − p)t−1 for every t ∈ IN for
some fixed 0 < p < 1. Let X =∑ni=1 Xi and µ = E[X]. Then it holds for every  > 0 that Pr[X ≥ (1+ )µ] ≤ e−2n/(2(1+/3))
and for all 0 ≤  ≤ 1 that Pr[X ≤ (1− )µ] ≤ e−2n/2.
Proof. Consider transforming every Xi = t into a binary string Bt = (000 . . . 01)with (t−1) zeroes. Then the event X1 = t1,
X2 = t2, X3 = t3, . . . can be represented by a string B of the form Bt1 ◦ Bt2 ◦ Bt3 . . . = 00 . . . 1 00 . . . 1 00 . . . 1 . . .. Notice that
B contains nmany 1’s and the total number of positions (0 or 1) in B is T =∑i ti.
Now, consider instead an infinite set of binary random variables Y1, Y2, Y3, . . . with Pr[Yi = 1] = p. Viewing Yi as
representing the ith position in B, it is not difficult to check that
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ T
]
= Pr
[
T∑
j=1
Yj ≤ n
]
and
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≤ T
]
= Pr
[
T∑
j=1
Yj ≥ n
]
.
Setting T = (1± )µ and applying the Chernoff bounds to∑Tj=1 Yj gives the lemma. 
Lemma 3.7 ([10]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be an arbitrary set of random variables and let f be a function satisfying the property that for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a non-negative ci such that |E[f | X1, . . . , Xi] − E[f | X1, . . . , Xi−1]| ≤ ci. Then
Pr[f ≥ E[f ] + t] ≤ e−t2/(2
∑n
i=1 c2i )
and
Pr[f ≤ E[f ] − t] ≤ e−t2/(2
∑n
i=1 c2i ).
Note that the Xi’s in this lemma are not required to be independent. Now we can start with the proof of Theorem 3.4. In
the following, the time is counted in rounds. Each successful application of the de Bruijn cuckoo rule defines a round. Thus,
an application of the round-robin cuckoo rule can have between m− 2t and m rounds, where m is the number of nodes in
the region in which the join operation is initiated and t is the number of adversarial nodes in that region.
Let Rˆ be any fixed region of size (c log n) ·k/n, for some constant c , for whichwewant to check the balancing andmajority
conditions over polynomial in nmany rejoin operations. Thus, Rˆ contains exactly c log nmany k-regions. The age of a k-region
is the difference between the current round and the last round when a new node was placed into it (and all old nodes got
evicted), and the age of Rˆ is defined as the sum of the ages of its k-regions. A node in Rˆ is called new if it was placed in Rˆwhen
it joined the system, and otherwise it is called old.
We assume that before the adversary starts with its rejoin operations, only the n blue nodes were in the system, and
sufficiently many rejoin operations have been executed on the blue nodes so that every k-region has been entered by a new
node at least once. Afterwards, the adversary enterswith its n red nodes one by one, using the round-robin cuckoo rule, and
then it starts executing rejoin operations on the red nodes as it likes. The assumption of acting on a sufficiently old system
significantly simplifies the proofs.
The next lemma follows directly from the round-robin cuckoo rule because every k-region can have at most one new
node at any time.
Lemma 3.8. At any time, Rˆ contains at most c log n new nodes.
In order to bound the number of old nodes in Rˆ, we first have to bound the age of Rˆ (Lemma 3.9). Then we bound the
maximum number of nodes in a k-region (Lemma 3.10) and use this to bound the number of evicted blue and red nodes in
a certain time interval (Lemma 3.11). After that, we can combine all lemmas to bound the number of old blue and red nodes
in Rˆ (Lemma 3.12).
Lemma 3.9. At any time, Rˆ has an age between (1− δ)(1/β)(c log n)(n/k) and (1+ δ)β(c log n)(n/k), with high probability,
where δ > 0 is a constant that can be made arbitrarily small depending on the constant c.
Proof. Let R1, . . . , RC be the k-regions of Rˆ, where C = c log n. For every k-region Ri, let the random variable Xi denote the
age of Ri at the beginning of the given round, and let X =∑Ci=1 Xi. We focus on a particular k-region Ri and consider the two
extreme cases for it. In case 1, the adversary aims at minimizing the lifetime of Ri, which it achieves by adaptively letting all
of its key generations fail that do not cause Ri to be replaced, and in case 2, the adversary aims at maximizing the lifetime
of Ri, which it achieves by adaptively letting all of its key generations fail that do cause Ri to be replaced. In addition to
these adaptive failures, the adversary also aims at causing failures of as many key generations by honest nodes as possible
in order tomaximize the impact of its adaptive strategy.When considering these two cases in the following, wewill assume
for simplicity that m (the number of nodes) and t (the number of adversarial nodes) are the same for all regions in which
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the adversary initiates a join operation. This will be fine for our calculations because what matters is only the ratio between
m and t .
Case 1: In order to prove a lower bound for the lifetime of Ri, let us assume for the moment that there arem− 2t successful
key generations by the blue nodes and t successful key generations by the red nodes, independent onwhether the generated
keys affect Ri or not. Then it holds that Pr[Xi = t] = (k/n)(1 − (k/n))t−1. Assuming that the system has in infinite
age, it follows that Xi is geometrically distributed with probability p = k/n. Thus, E[Xi] = 1/p = n/k, and therefore,
E[X] =∑Ci=1 E[Xi] = (n/k) ·C . This also holds up to a negligible deviation if the system has an age ofΩ((n/k) log n) rounds,
which is implied by our assumption above that the system is sufficiently old so that each k-region has been hit at least once
by a joining node, w.h.p. It remains to show that X is concentrated around E[X].
Unfortunately, the ages of the k-regions are not independent as two k-regions cannot have the same age. However, there
is an easy solution to this problem. Let Y1, . . . , YC be independent random variables with the same probability distributions
as X1, . . . , XC and let Y =∑Ci=1 Yi. For a lower bound on the age of Rˆ, we use the mapping f : INC → INC with
f (t1, t2, . . . , tC ) = (t1 + d1, t2 + d2, . . . , tC + dC )
where
dj = |{k ∈ {1, . . . , C} | tk < tj ∨ (tk = tj ∧ k < j)}|
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , C}. It is easy to check that this mapping is injective. Furthermore, for all (t1, . . . , tC ) ∈ IN it holds for
(t ′1, . . . , t
′
C ) = f (t1, . . . , tC ) that t ′1, . . . , t ′C are pairwise disjoint and
Pr[Y1 = t1 ∧ · · · ∧ YC = tC ] = Pr[X1 = t ′1 ∧ . . . ∧ XC = t ′C ]
Hence, for any T ≥ 0,
Pr[Y ≥ T ] =
∑
(t1,...,tC )∈INC ,
∑
i ti≥T
Pr[(Y1, . . . , YC ) = (t1, . . . , tC )]
=
∑
(t1,...,tC )∈INC ,
∑
i ti≥T
Pr[(X1, . . . , XC ) = f (t1, . . . , tC )]
≤
∑
{t ′1,...,t ′C }⊆IN,
∑
i t
′
i≥T
Pr[(X1, . . . , XC ) = (t ′1, . . . , t ′C )]
= Pr[X ≥ T ]
and therefore Pr[X ≤ T ] ≤ Pr[Y ≤ T ]. Combining this with Lemma 3.6, it follows that Pr[X ≤ (1−δ)C ·n/k] is polynomially
small for any constant δ > 0 depending on the constant in C .
However, of the t adversarial key generations, only those will succeed that generate a key in some region Ri, which
implies that of the m − t key generations considered above, up to t may get canceled. Thus, the age of Rˆ can reduce
up to a (m − 2t)/(m − t) ≥ 1/β-factor. Combining this with the prior lower bound on Rˆ gives a lower bound of
(1− δ)(1/β)(c log n)(n/k) that holds w.h.p.
Case 2: In order to prove an upper bound for the lifetime of Ri, let us ignore the keys generated by the adversarial nodes
for the moment and only focus on the m − 2t successful key generations by blue nodes. Then it holds that Pr[Xi = t] =
(k/n)(1− (k/n))t−1 and, therefore, E[Xi] = n/k. Furthermore, for all ages 0 < t1 < t2 · · · < tC ,
Pr[Xi = ti | X1 = t1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xi−1 = ti−1] =
(
k
n
)(
1− k
n
)ti−1−(i−1)
=
(
1− k
n
)−(i−1)
Pr[Yi = ti]
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ C because Ri can only be hit at rounds that are different from t1, . . . , ti−1. Hence,
Pr[X1 = t1 ∧ · · · ∧ XC = tC ] =
C∏
i=1
Pr[Xi = ti | X1 = t1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xi−1 = ti−1]
=
C∏
i=1
(
1− k
n
)−(i−1)
Pr[Yi = ti]
=
(
1− k
n
)−(C2)
Pr[Y1 = t1 ∧ · · · ∧ YC = tC ]
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Since all Xi’s have the same probability distribution, it holds for any T ≥ 1 that
Pr[X ≥ T ] =
∑
{t1,...,tC }⊆IN,
∑
i ti≥T
Pr[X1 = t1 ∧ · · · ∧ XC = tC ]
=
∑
{t1,...,tC }⊆IN,
∑
i ti≥T
Pr[Y1 = t1 ∧ · · · ∧ YC = tC ]
(
1− k
n
)−(C2)
≤
(
1− k
n
)−(C2)
Pr[Y ≥ T ] ≤ eC2k/n Pr[Y ≥ T ].
Combining thiswith Lemma3.6, it follows that Pr[X ≥ (1+δ)C ·n/k] is polynomially small for any constant δ > 0 depending
on the constant in C .
However, when also considering the t key generations by red nodes, the age of Rˆ can increase up to an (m−t)/(m−2t) ≤
β-factor. Combining thiswith the prior upper bound on Rˆ gives an upper bound of (1−δ)β(c log n)(n/k) that holdsw.h.p. 
Lemma 3.10. For any k-region R in Rˆ it holds at any time that R has at most O(k log n) nodes, with high probability.
Proof. Following the arguments of Lemma 2.6 in [4], there are at most (1 + )n · (1 + δ)γ ln n node replacements during
the lifetime of a k-region, w.h.p., for some constant δ > 0. Hence, the expected number of nodes in a k-region can be at most
k
n
· ((1+ )n · (1+ δ)γ ln n+ 1) = (1+ )(1+ δ)k · γ ln n+ 1
w.h.p. Since the locations of the node replacements are independent (if they are due to different rounds) or negatively
correlated (if they happen at the same round), it follows from the Chernoff bounds for negatively correlated variables [27]
that the number of nodes in a k-region is at most O(k log n) at any time, w.h.p. 
Next we bound the number of blue and red nodes that are evicted in a certain time interval.
Lemma 3.11. For any time interval I of size T = (γ /) log3 n, the number of blue nodes that are evicted in I is within (1±δ)T ·k,
with high probability, and the number of red nodes that are evicted in I is within (1± δ)T · k, with high probability, where δ > 0
can be made arbitrarily small depending on γ .
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 2.9 in [4] and repeated here for completeness. We start
with the proof for the blue nodes. Consider any time interval I consisting of T rounds. For every t ∈ {1, . . . , T } let the
random variable Xt denote the number of blue nodes evicted in the tth round of I , and let X = ∑Tt=1 Xt . Since there
are n blue nodes in the system, it follows that E[Xt ] = k for every t , no matter how the blue nodes are distributed, and
therefore E[X] = T · k. From Lemma 3.10 we know that every Xt is at most 4 log n, w.h.p. Also, for any given X1, . . . , Xt−1,
E[Xt | X1, . . . , Xt−1] = E[Xt ] = k. Hence, it holds for the function f (X1, . . . , Xn) =∑ni=1 Xi that, w.h.p.,
|E[f | X1, . . . , Xi] − E[f | X1, . . . , Xi−1]| =
∣∣∣∣∣
(
E
[
n∑
j=i+1
(Xj | X1, . . . , Xi)
]
+
i∑
j=1
Xj
)
−
(
E
[
n∑
j=i
(Xj | X1, . . . , Xi−1)
]
+
i−1∑
j=1
Xj
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
(
n∑
j=i+1
E[Xj | X1, . . . , Xi] +
i∑
j=1
Xj
)
−
(
n∑
j=i
E[Xj | X1, . . . , Xi] +
i−1∑
j=1
Xj
)∣∣∣∣∣
= |Xi − E[Xi]| ≤ 4 log n
For that bound the method of bounded martingale differences (Lemma 3.7) implies that, for any constant δ ≥ 0,
Pr[X ≥ (1+ δ)T · k] ≤ e−δ2(T ·k)2/(2
∑T
i=1(4 log n)2)
which is polynomially small in n if the constant in T is sufficiently large. The same holds for Pr[X ≤ (1 − δ)T · k], which
proves the lemma for the blue nodes. The proof for the red nodes is the same. 
Combining Lemmas 3.9–3.11, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12. At any time, Rˆ has between (1 − δ)(1/β)(c log n) · k and (1 + δ)β(c log n) · k old blue nodes and between
(1−δ)(1/β)(c log n) ·k and (1+δ)β(c log n) ·k old red nodes, with high probability, where the lower bound on the red nodes
holds if none of the red nodes has rejoined.
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Proof. Consider any age distribution t1, . . . , tC for the k-regions R1, . . . , RC of Rˆ, where C = c log n. Let T = (γ /) log3 n
be selected as in Lemma 3.11. Under the assumption that the locations of the replaced nodes are chosen independently at
random, it follows from Lemma 3.11 and the Chernoff bounds that Rˆ has at least
(1− δ)T · k
n/k
C∑
i=1
bti/Tc ≥ (1− δ)k
2
n
(
C∑
i=1
ti − C · T
)
blue nodes and at most
(1+ δ)T · k
n/k
C∑
i=1
dti/Te ≤ (1+ δ)k
2
n
(
C∑
i=1
ti + C · T
)
blue nodes, w.h.p.
Unfortunately, due to the use of the de Bruijn cuckoo rule, the locations of the nodes are not completely independent.
However, from Lemma 3.10we know that a k-region contains atmost bk log n nodes for some constant b, w.h.p., and through
standard Chernoff bounds we can show that the maximum age of a k-region is at most f (n/k) log n for a sufficiently large
constant f , w.h.p. Hence, under the assumption of independent replacements, the probability of havingmore than p different
node pairs from the evicted k-regions that are both placed into Rˆ and are still there is at most
(f (n/k) log n)p
(
bk log n
2
)p ( c log n
n/k
)2p
≤
(
b2fkn log3 n
2
)p (
(ck log n)2
n2
)p
=
(
f (bc)2k3 log5 n
2n
)p
which is polynomially small for a constant p. Hence, there are only a constant number of nodes ending up in Rˆ that have at
least one other node coming from the same k-region, w.h.p. This is small enough so that we can ignore these nodes for an
upper and lower bound on the number of old nodes in Rˆ and treat node replacements as if they were independent (although
they are not). Hence, up to a (1 + o(1)) factor the bounds above also apply to the de Bruijn cuckoo rule. Since∑Ci=1 ti is
between (1− δ′)(1/β)Cn/k and (1+ δ′)βCn/k according to Lemma 3.9, w.h.p., Lemma 3.12 follows for the blue nodes.
The same calculations (with an additional  factor) apply to the red nodes. 
Combining Lemmas 3.8 and 3.12, we can now prove when the balancing and majority conditions are satisfied.
• Balancing condition: From Lemmas 3.8 and 3.12 it follows that every region R of size (c log n)k/n has at least (1 −
δ)(1/β)(c log n) · k and at most (1 + δ)β(c log n + (c log n)k + (c log n)k) = (1 + δ)β(c log n)(1 + (1 + )k) nodes,
where the constant δ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small. Hence, the regions are balanced within a factor of close to
β2(1+  + 1/k).
• Majority condition: From Lemmas 3.8 and 3.12 it also follows that every region of size (c log n)k/n has at least
(1−δ)(1/β)(c log n)·k blue nodes and atmost (1+δ)(c log n+β(c log n)·k) red nodes, w.h.p., where the constant δ > 0
can be made arbitrarily small. Hence, the adversary is not able to obtain the majority in any region of size (c log n)k/n as
long as (c log n)(β · k+ 1) < (1/β)(c log n) · kwhich is true if and only if  < (1/β)(1/β − 1/k).
Hence, for  < (1/β)(1/β−1/k) the balancing andmajority conditions are satisfied, w.h.p., which proves Theorem 3.4. 
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a simple and robust random number generator sufficient for keeping honest and adversarial
peers well distributed in [0, 1). We only proved our results assuming a sequential execution of rejoin operations (see our
model) though we expect that as long as not too many rejoin operations are executed concurrently, there should be only
insignificant side effects (see also the comments in [28]).
Interesting problems for future work are how to extend our results to general β-biasedm-RNGs and how to extend our
RNGs to the situation in which the system can be under DoS attacks.
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